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Abstract
We analyze linear McKean-Vlasov forward-backward SDEs arising in leader-follower games with
mean-field type control and terminal state constraints on the state process. We establish an existence
and uniqueness of solutions result for such systems in time-weighted spaces as well as a convergence
result of the solutions with respect to certain perturbations of the drivers of both the forward and the
backward component. The general results are used to solve a novel single-player model of portfolio
liquidation under market impact with expectations feedback as well as a novel Stackelberg game of
optimal portfolio liquidation with asymmetrically informed players.
AMS Subject Classification: 93E20, 91B70, 60H30
Keywords: mean-field control, Stackelberg game, mean-field game with a major player, McKean-Vlasov
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1 Introduction and overview
Mean field games (MFGs) are a powerful tool to analyze strategic interactions in large populations when
each individual player has only a small impact on the behavior of other players. Introduced independently
by Huang, Malhame´ and Caines [18] and Lasry and Lions [22], MFGs have received considerable attention
in the probability and stochastic control literature in the last decade. A probabilistic approach to solving
MFGs was introduced by Carmona and Delarue in [11]. Using a maximum principle of Pontryagin type,
they showed that solving the MFG reduces to solving a McKean-Vlasov forward-backward SDE (FBSDE)
of form, 
dXt = b(t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt, Yt)) dt+ σ dWt,
−dYt = h(t,Xt, Yt,L(Xt, Yt)) dt− Zt dWt,
X0 = χ, YT = l(XT ,L(XT )),
(1.1)
where X is the state of the representative player, Y is the adjoint variable, and L(·) denotes the law of a
stochastic process. In MFGs with common noise [2, 3] the dependence of the coefficients on the law of the
process (X,Y ) is of conditional form. FBSDEs of the form (1.1) also arise in mean-field control (MFC)
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problems [1, 4, 12] and in MFGs with a major player [8, 9, 13] when formulating stochastic maximum
principles. MFGs with a major player are a special class of leader-follower games with mean-field control.
In such a game, the leader’s optimization problem can be viewed as MFC control problem where the
state dynamics follows a controlled FBSDE that characterizes the representative minor agent’s optimal
response to the leader’s control. We study a novel class of leader-follower games with mean-field control
and terminal state constraint on the state processes that naturally arise in Stackelberg games of optimal
portfolio liquidation with asymmetrically informed players.
1.1 McKean-Vlasov FBSDE with terminal state constraint
Let W = (W,W 0) be a multi-dimensional Brownian motion generating the filtration F = (Ft)t≥0 and
let F0 = (F0t )t≥0 be the filtration generated by W 0. In this paper, we consider linear McKean-Vlasov
FBSDEs of the form
dQt =
(−Λ1tRt − Λ2tE [γtQt| F0t ]+ f t) dt,
−dRt =
(
Λ4tQt + Λ
3
tE[ζtRt|F0s ] + Λ5tE[̺tQt|F0t ] + gt
)
dt− Zt dWt,
Q0 = χ, QT = 0,
(1.2)
with given initial and terminal condition for the forward, and unspecified terminal condition for the back-
ward process. FBSDEs of this form arise in linear-quadratic MFGs, MFC problems, and leader-follower
games under a terminal state constraint on the state process when formulating stochastic maximum
principles. Under a terminal state constraint on the state sequence the terminal value of the adjoint
process is unknown. The special case Λ2 = Λ3 = Λ5 = f = g = 0 arises in the single player portfolio
liquidation models under market impact studied in, e.g. [5, 17]. The special case Λ2 = Λ5 = f = g = 0
was recently analyzed in [14] in the framework of a MFG of optimal portfolio liquidation.
We prove a general existence and uniqueness of solutions result for the system (1.2) under boundedness
assumptions on the model parameters that allows us to solve single player portfolio liquidation problems
with private information and expectations feedback. The existence and uniqueness result is comple-
mented by a convergence result for the solution of (1.2) with respect to the parameters (f, g) that allows
us to formulate a stochastic maximum principle for leader-follower games of portfolio liquidation with
asymmetrically informed players.
The existence and uniqueness of solutions to (1.2) is obtained via two nested continuation arguments.
Standard continuation methods for McKean-Vlasov FBSDEs established in, e.g. [3, 10] do not apply to
the system (1.2), due to the unknown terminal value of the backward process. In order to overcome this
problem we make a linear ansatz R = AQ+H , from which we derive an exogenous BSDE with singular
terminal condition for the process A, and a BSDE with known asymptotic behavior at the terminal time
for the process H . The driver of the latter BSDE depends on the unbounded process A. The nature of
the FBSDE for (Q,H) is different from [14] where a similar ansatz gave a BSDE with known terminal
condition. Analyzing simultaneously the triple (Q,H,R) allows us to prove the fixed-point condition
arising in the application of the continuation method in a suitable space.
Our second main result is a convergence result for the solution (Q,R) to the system (1.2) with respect
to the “input” (f, g). Our convergence is not in the L2 sense as in the standard FBSDE literature
[23, 26] but rather in the Lν (1 < ν < 2) sense. Specifically, we consider the convergence of the solutions
(Qn, Rn) to a penalized version of (1.2) under a uniform L2 boundedness assumption on the sequence
(f
n
, gn). For such inputs a result of Komlo´s [20] guarantees the Cesaro convergence of (f
n
, gn) along a
subsequence in Lν (1 < ν < 2). We prove the convergence of the solutions in the same sense. To this
end, we define auxiliary processes to decouple the system (1.2) and then show that these processes solve
the system (1.2) in the right spaces. The convergence result then follows from the previously established
uniqueness result.
2
1.2 Applications to optimal portfolio liquidation
Models of optimal portfolio liquidation have received substantial attention in the financial mathematics
and stochastic control literature in recent years; see [5, 15, 16, 17, 21, 25] among many others. In such
models, the controlled state sequence typically follows a dynamic of the form
Xt = x−
∫ t
0
ξs ds,
where x ∈ R is the initial portfolio, and ξ is the trading rate. The set of admissible controls is confined
to those processes ξ that satisfy almost surely the liquidation constraint XT = 0. It is typically assumed
that the unaffected price process against which the trading costs are benchmarked follows some Brownian
martingale S and that the trader’s transaction price is given by
S˜t = St −
∫ t
0
κsξs ds− ηtξt.
The integral term accounts for permanent price impact; the term ηtξt accounts for instantaneous impact
that does not affect future transactions. The trader’s objective is then to minimize the cost functional
J(ξ) = E
[∫ T
0
(
κsξsXs + ηs|ξs|2 + λs|xs|2
)
ds
]
over all admissible liquidation strategies. We refer to [5, 17] for an interpretation of the processes η, κ, λ.
1.2.1 Single player model with expectations feedback
Standard portfolio liquidation models assume that a trader’s permanent price impact is driven by his
observable transactions. If the transactions are not directly observable, then it is natural to assume that
the permanent impact is driven by the market’s expectation about the trader’s transactions as in [1, 6],
given the publicly observable information.
In Section 3 we solve a single-player liquidation model with expectations feedback where uncertainty
is generated by the multi-dimensional Brownian motion W = (W,W 0). The Brownian motion W 0
describes a commonly observed random factor that drives market dynamics; the Brownian motion W is
private information to the trader. Specifically, we assume that the trader’s transaction price is given by
S˜t = St −
∫ t
0
{
κsE[ξs|F0s ] + g˜s
}
ds− ηtξt, (1.3)
where S is an F0 martingale, E[ξs|F0s ] is the market’s expectation about the trader’s strategy, and g˜ is
an F0-adapted process that will be endogenized in the next subsection. Assuming a standard quadratic
running cost function as in [5, 16, 17], the objective of the trader is then to minimize the functional
J(ξ) = E
[∫ T
0
κtXtE[ξt|F0t ] + g˜tXt + ηtξ2t + λtX2t dt
]
, (1.4)
subject to the state dynamics
dXt = −ξt dt
X0 = x, XT = 0.
(1.5)
We allow the cost coefficients to be private information, i.e. to be F adapted. This justifies the conditional
expectation term in the price dynamics. A standard stochastic maximum principle suggests that the
optimal strategy is given by
ξ∗t =
Yt − E[κtXt|F0t ]
2ηt
, (1.6)
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where X is the portfolio process, Y is the adjoint variable, and (X,Y ) solves (1.2) with f = 0, g = g˜:
dXt = − Yt − E[κtXt|F
0
t ]
2ηt
dt,
−dYt =
(
κtE
[
Yt
2ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]− κtE [ 12ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]E[κtXt|F0t ] + 2λtXt + g˜t) dt− Zt dWt,
X0 = x, XT = 0.
(1.7)
If the terms E[κtXt|F0t ] and κtE
[
1
2ηt
∣∣∣F0t ]E[κtXt|F0t ] drop out of the FBSDE system, then the system
reduces to that arising in the MFG analyzed in [14]. In the next subsection we introduce a model
extension where the privately informed trader is the follower in a Stackelberg game of optimal portfolio
liquidation. As a byproduct we obtain an extension of the MFG in [14] to a MFG with a major player.
A related model without liquidation constraint and without any feedback of the major player’s strategy
on the minor players’ transaction price has been considered in [19].
1.2.2 Mean-Field type Stackelberg game with asymmetric information
In Section 4 we solve a Stackelberg game of optimal portfolio liquidation with asymmetrically informed
players. The leader (she) has the first-mover advantage while the follower (he) has an informational
advantage.
We assume again that uncertainty is generated by the multi-dimensional Brownian motionW = (W,W 0)
and thatW 0 describes a commonly observed market factor whileW is private information to the follower.
For a given F0-adapted strategy ξ0 of the Stackelberg leader, we assume that the follower’s liquidation
problem is the same as in the previous subsection with g˜ = κ˜0ξ0 for some F0-adapted process κ˜0. Let
ξ∗(·) be the follower’s optimal response function to the leader’s strategy and put µ∗ := E[ξ∗(·)|F0].
Following the standard approach we assume that the leader’s transaction price is
S˜0t = St −
∫ t
0
κ0sµ
∗
s ds−
∫ t
0
κ0sξ
0
s ds− η0t ξ0t (1.8)
for F0-adapted coefficients η0, κ0, κ0. The difference is that now the leader controls the transaction price
both directly and indirectly through the dependence of the follower’s optimal response on her trading
strategy. We furthermore assume that the leader’s cost functional is given by
J0(ξ0) = E
[∫ T
0
(
κ0tµ
∗
tX
0
t + κ
0
tX
0
t ξ
0
t + η
0
t (ξ
0
t )
2 + λ0t (X
0
t )
2 + λt(µ
∗
t )
2
)
dt
]
, (1.9)
where X0 denotes her portfolio process and λ0, λ are F0-adapted. Her control problem is then a MFC
problem with state process (X0, X, Y ), where (X,Y ) solves (1.7) with g˜ = κ˜0ξ0 and
dX0t = −ξ0t dt
X00 = x, X
0
T = 0.
(1.10)
We establish a new maximum principle for this control problem from which we derive an explicit repre-
sentation of the major player’s optimal control ξ0,∗ as
ξ0,∗t =
pt + E[κ˜
0
t qt|F0t ]− κ0tX0,∗t
2η0t
(1.11)
in terms of the state equation (1.10) and the adjoint equations:
− dpt =
(
κ0tE
[
Yt
2ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]− κ0tE [ 12ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]E[κtXt|F0t ] + κ0t ξ0t + 2λ0tX0t) dt− Zt dW 0t (1.12)
4
and 
−dqt =
(
− rt
2ηt
− E [κtqt|F0t ] 12ηt + f t
)
dt,
−drt =
(
−2λtqt + κtE
[
rt
2ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]+ κtE [ 12ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]E[κtqt|F0t ] + gt) dt− Zt dWt,
q0 = 0, qT = 0,
(1.13)
where
f t =
κ0tX
0
t
2ηt
+
λt
ηt
E
[
Yt
2ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]− λtηt E
[
1
2ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]E[κtXt|F0t ]
and
gt = −κtE
[
1
2ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]κ0tX0t − 2λtκtE [ 12ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ](E [ Yt2ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]− E [ 12ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]E[κtXt|F0t ]) .
Here, p is the adjoint variable to X0 and (q, r) are the adjoint variables to (Y,X). The system (1.13) is
again a special case of (1.2).
In order to establish our maximum principle we first consider a sequence of unconstrained optimization
problems where the liquidation constraints are replaced by increasingly penalized open positions at the
terminal time. The resulting optimal strategies for the Stackelberg leader turn out to be L2 bounded,
hence they have Cesaro convergent subsequence. From this we deduce that the sequence of state-adjoint
equations for the penalized problems Cesaro converges to the system (1.7), (1.10), (1.12) and (1.13).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Our general existence, uniqueness and convergence results
for the FBSDE (1.2) are established in Section 2. The MFC problem and the Stackelberg game of optimal
portfolio liquidation introduced above are solved in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively.
Notation and conventions. Throughout, we work on probability space (Ω,P,F), on which there
exist two independent Brownian motions W 0 and W . We denote by F0 = (F0t )0≤t≤T and F = (Ft)0≤t≤T
the filtrations generated byW 0 andW , augmented by the P null sets, respectively, whereW = (W,W 0).
For a space I and a filtration G we introduce the following spaces:
L0G([0, T ]× Ω; I) ={X : X : [0, T ]× Ω→ I and X is G progressively measurable and I valued}
LkG([0, T ]× Ω; I) =
{
X ∈ L0G([0, T ]× Ω; I) : E
[∫ T
0
|Xt|k dt
]
<∞
}
, k ≥ 1
L∞G ([0, T ]× Ω; I) =
{
X ∈ L0G([0, T ]× Ω; I) : ess sup
(t,ω)∈[0,T ]×Ω
|Xt(ω)| <∞
}
.
The spaces Lk
G
are equipped the norm ‖X‖Lk =
(
E
[∫ T
0
|Xt|k dt
])1/k
. The spaces
S2G([0, T ]× Ω; I) =
{
X ∈ L0G([0, T ]× Ω; I) : E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|Xt|2
]
<∞
}
S2,−
G
([0, T )× Ω; I) =
{
X ∈ L0G([0, T )× Ω; I) : sup
ǫ>0
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T−ǫ
|Xt|2
]
≤ C
}
are equipped with the respective norms
‖X‖S2 :=
(
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|Xt|2
])1/2
; ‖X‖S2,− := sup
ǫ≥0
(
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T−ǫ
|Xt|2
])1/2
,
and for β > 0 we introduce the space
Hβ =
{
X ∈ S2F([0, T ]× Ω; I) : E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣∣ |Xt|(T − t)β
∣∣∣∣2
]
<∞
}
with ‖X‖β :=
(
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣ Xt(T − t)β
∣∣∣∣2
])1/2
.
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For φ ∈ L∞
G
([0, T ]× Ω; I), we denote by ‖φ‖ and φ⋆ its upper and lower bounds, respectively. Finally,
we adopt the convention that a positive constant C may vary from line to line.
2 The McKean-Vlasov FBSDE
In this section, we prove a general existence and uniqueness of solutions result (in a suitable space) for
the FBSDE (1.2) along with the convergence result with respect to the processes (f, g). We assume
throughout that the system coefficients satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 2.1. i) The stochastic processes γ, ζ, ̺ and Λi (i = 1, · · · , 5) belong to L∞
F
.
ii) There exist constants θi > 0 (i = 1, 2) such that(
Λ1 − ‖γ‖|Λ
2|2
2θ1
− ‖Λ
3‖|ζ|2
2θ2
)
⋆
> 0
and (
Λ4 − ‖γ‖θ1
2
− ‖Λ
3‖θ2
2
− ‖Λ5‖‖̺‖
)
⋆
> 0.
iii) The initial condition χ belongs to L2
F
and (f, g) ∈ S2
F
× L2
F
.
The linear ansatz R = AQ+H on [0, T ) results in the following FBSDE for the triple (Q,H,R):
dQt =
(−Λ1tRt − Λ2tE [γtQt| F0t ]+ f t) dt,
−dHt =
(−Λ1tAtHt − Λ2tAtE[γtQt|F0t ] +Atf t + Λ3tE[ζtRt|F0t ]
+Λ5tE[̺tQt|F0t ] + gt
)
dt− Zt dWt,
−dRt =
(
Λ4tQt + Λ
3
tE[ζtRt|F0s ] + Λ5tE[̺tQt|F0t ] + gt
)
dt− Zt dWt,
R = AQ+H, t ∈ [0, T ),
Q0 = χ, QT = 0,
(2.1)
where A satisfies the singular BSDE
− dAt =
(
Λ4t − Λ1tA2t
)
dt− Zt dWt, lim
tրT
At =∞. (2.2)
It has been shown in [5, 17] that the equation (2.2) is well-posed under Assumption 2.1 and that the
following estimate holds:
1
E
[∫ T
t
Λ1u du
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ At ≤
1
(T − t)2E
[∫ T
t
1
Λ1u
+ (T − u)2Λ4u du
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
. (2.3)
It follows from (2.3) that A is nonnegative and that for all 0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ T ,
e−
∫ t2
t1
Λ1sAs ds ≤ C
(
T − t2
T − t1
)β
≤ C
(
T − t2
T − t1
)τ
, where β := Λ1⋆/‖Λ1‖ and 0 ≤ τ ≤ β. (2.4)
2.1 Existence and uniqueness of solutions
In view of [14], we expect to find a solution (Q,H,R) to (2.1) such that (Q,R) ∈ Hα × L2F for some
α > 0. Unlike in [14] the process H is only defined on [0, T ). The following heuristics suggests that if we
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can find a solution such that (Q,R) ∈ Hα ×L2F, then H ∈ S2,−F . In fact, by the general solution formula
for linear BSDEs, for any 0 ≤ t < T˜ < T ,
Ht = E
[
HT˜ e
−
∫
T˜
t
Λ1uAu du +
∫ T˜
t
e−
∫
s
t
Λ1uAu duKs ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
,
where
Ks =
(−Λ2sAsE[γsQs|F0s ] +Asfs + Λ3sE[ζsRs|F0s ] + Λ5sE[̺sQs|F0s ] + gs) .
If we knew that
lim sup
T˜րT
E[|HT˜ |2] <∞, (2.5)
then taking the limit T˜ ր T and using the estimate (2.4),
Ht = E
[∫ T
t
e−
∫
s
t
Λ1uAu duKs ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
. (2.6)
From this and using (2.4) again, we obtain a constant C > 0 such that for any ǫ > 0,
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T−ǫ
|Ht|2
]
≤ C (‖Q‖α + ‖f‖S2 + ‖R‖L2 + ‖g‖L2) .
Since (2.5) holds for H ∈ S2,−
F
our goal is to establish the existence and uniqueness of a solution
(Q,H,R) ∈ Hα × S2,−F × L2F. To this end, we apply a nested continuation method to the system:
dQt =
(−Λ1tRt − Λ2tE [γtQt| F0t ]+ f t) dt,
−dHt =
(−Λ1tAtHt − Λ2tAtE[γtQt|F0t ] +Atf t + pΛ3tE[ζtRt|F0t ]
+pΛ5tE[̺tQt|F0t ] + gt + ft
)
dt− Zt dWt,
−dRt =
(
Λ4tQt + pΛ
3
tE[ζtRt|F0s ] + pΛ5tE[̺tQt|F0t ] + gt + ft
)
dt− Zt dWt,
R = AQ+H, t ∈ [0, T ),
Q0 = χ, QT = 0.
(2.7)
In a first step, we prove the existence of a unique solution to the above system for p = 0. Subsequently,
we show that the solution result extends to p = 1.
Lemma 2.2. If p = 0, then the FBSDE (2.7) has a solution in Hα × S2,−F × L2F for any f ∈ L2F, where
0 < α < β.
Proof. Notice that the system (2.7) is still coupled for p = 0. To solve it, we apply a continuation method
to the following system:
dQt =
(−Λ1tRt − pΛ2tE [γtQt| F0t ]+ f t + b′t) dt,
−dHt =
(−Λ1tAtHt − pΛ2tAtE[γtQt|F0t ] +Atf t + gt + ft + f ′t) dt− Zt dWt,
−dRt =
(
Λ4tQt + gt + ft + f
′
t −Atb′t
)
dt− Zt dWt,
R = AQ+H, t ∈ [0, T ),
Q0 = χ, QT = 0.
(2.8)
Step 1. For p = 0, the system (2.8) is solvable in Hα × S2,−F × L2F for any (b′, f ′) ∈ Hα ×Hα−1.
If p = 0, then the system (2.8) is decoupled and we let H be
Ht = E
[∫ T
t
e−
∫
s
t
Λ1uAu du
(
Asfs + gs + fs + f
′
s
)
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, 0 ≤ t < T. (2.9)
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Moreover, by the estimate (2.4) and Doob’s maximal inequality, we have for any ǫ > 0,
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T−ǫ
|Ht|2
]
≤ C (‖f‖S2 + ‖g‖L2 + ‖f‖L2 + ‖f ′‖α−1) , (2.10)
where C is independent of ǫ. Thus, H belongs to S2,−
F
and satisfies the SDE in (2.8).
We now turn to the process Q. Taking R = AQ +H into the SDE for Q yields,
Qt = χe
−
∫
t
0
Λ1uAu du +
∫ t
0
e−
∫
t
s
Λ1uAu du
(−Λ1sHs + fs + b′s) ds, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (2.11)
Using monotone convergence and the estimate (2.10) this implies,
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣ Qt(T − t)α
∣∣∣∣2
]
≤ C
‖χ‖L2 + E
(∫ T
0
|Hs|
(T − s)α ds
)2+ ‖f‖S2 + ‖b′‖α

= C
‖χ‖L2 + lim
ǫց0
E
(∫ T−ǫ
0
|Hs|
(T − s)α ds
)2+ ‖f‖S2 + ‖b′‖α

≤ C
(
‖χ‖L2 + lim
ǫց0
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T−ǫ
|Ht|2
]
+ ‖f‖S2 + ‖b′‖α
)
≤ C (‖χ‖L2 + ‖f‖S2 + ‖g‖L2 + ‖f‖L2 + ‖f ′‖α−1 + ‖b′‖α) .
(2.12)
This shows that Q ∈ Hα. Integration by parts for the product QR on [0, T − ǫ] yields,
HT−ǫQT−ǫ ≤ AT−ǫQ2T−ǫ +HT−ǫQT−ǫ = QT−ǫRT−ǫ
≤ −
∫ T−ǫ
0
(
Q2t +R
2
t
)
dt+ CA0χ
2 + |χH0|+ C
∫ T−ǫ
0
|Qt||gt + ft + f ′t +Atb′t| dt
+
∫ T−ǫ
0
QtZt dW t.
Taking expectations on both sides we have
E
[∫ T−ǫ
0
(
Q2t +R
2
t
)
dt
]
≤ E[CA0χ2] + E[|χH0|] + CE
[∫ T−ǫ
0
|Qt||gt + ft + f ′t +Atb′t| dt
]
+ E[|HT−ǫQT−ǫ|]
≤ C (E[A0χ2] + CE[|χH0|] + ‖Q‖α)
+ C (‖g‖L2 + ‖f‖L2 + ‖f ′‖α−1 + ‖b′‖α) + E[|HT−ǫQT−ǫ|],
Thus, by taking ǫ→ 0, from (2.3), (2.10) and (2.12) we get R ∈ L2
F
.
Step 2. If (2.8) admits a solution for some p ∈ [0, 1] and for any (b′, f ′) ∈ Hα ×Hα−1, then the same
holds for p+ d for some constant d that does not depend on p.
For fixed Q ∈ Hα, since
−dΛ2E [γQ| F0]+ b′ ∈ Hα, −dΛ2AE[γQ|F0] + f ′ ∈ Hα−1,
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there exists a solution (Q˜, H˜, R˜) ∈ Hα × S2,−F × L2F to the following system:
dQ˜t =
(
−Λ1t R˜t − pΛ2tE
[
γtQ˜t
∣∣∣F0t ]− dΛ2tE [γtQt| F0t ]+ f t + b′t) dt,
−dH˜t =
(
−Λ1tAtH˜t − pΛ2tAtE[γtQ˜t|F0t ]− dΛ2tAtE[γtQt|F0t ]
+Atf t + gt + ft + f
′
t
)
dt− Zt dWt,
−dR˜t =
(
Λ4t Q˜t + gt + ft + f
′
t −Atb′t
)
dt− Zt dWt,
R˜ = AQ˜+ H˜, t ∈ [0, T ),
Q˜0 = χ, Q˜T = 0.
(2.13)
It remains to prove that the mapping Φ : Hα → Hα, Q 7→ Q˜ is a contraction when d is small enough and
independent of p. For any Q, Q′ ∈ Hα, let (Q˜, H˜, R˜) and (Q˜′, H˜ ′, R˜′) be the corresponding solutions.
Integration by parts for (Q˜ − Q˜′)(R˜− R˜′) on [0, T − ǫ] implies,
E
[∫ T−ǫ
0
(
Λ4s −
‖γ‖θ1
2
)
(Q˜s − Q˜′s)2 dts
]
+ E
[∫ T−ǫ
0
(
Λ1s −
‖γ‖(Λ2s)2
2θ1
)
(R˜s − R˜′s)2 dt
]
≤ CE
[
|Q˜T−ǫH˜T−ǫ|
]
+ εE
[∫ T−ǫ
0
(
R˜s − R˜′s
)2
ds
]
+ CdE
[∫ T−ǫ
0
(Qt −Q′t)2 dt
]
.
Letting ǫ→ 0 and choosing ε small enough, Assumption 2.1 yields,
E
[∫ T
0
(Q˜s − Q˜′s)2 dts
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
(R˜s − R˜′s)2 ds
]
≤ CdE
[∫ T
0
(Qt −Q′t)2 dt
]
. (2.14)
Considering the SDE for Q˜ in terms of R˜, by (2.14) we have
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|Q˜t − Q˜′t|2
]
≤ CdE
[∫ T
0
(Qt −Q′t)2 dt
]
. (2.15)
Since H˜ ∈ S2,−
F
, we have the following expression:
H˜t = E
[∫ T
t
e−
∫
s
t
Λ1uAu du
(
−pΛ2tAtE[γtQ˜t|F0t ]− dΛ2tAtE[γtQt|F0t ]
+Atf t + gt + ft + f
′
t
)
dt
)∣∣Ft] .
(2.16)
From (2.16), Doob’s maximal inequality and (2.15) yield that for any ǫ > 0
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T−ǫ
|H˜t − H˜ ′t|2
]
≤ CE
 sup0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣∣E
[∫ T
t
(T − s)β−1
(T − t)β E[ |Q˜s − Q˜
′
s||F0s ] ds
∣∣∣Ft
]∣∣∣∣∣
2

+ CdE
 sup0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣∣E
[∫ T
t
(T − s)β−1
(T − t)β E[ |Qs −Q
′
s||F0s ] ds
∣∣Ft
]∣∣∣∣∣
2

≤ CE
{
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣E [ sup
0≤s≤T
E[ |Q˜s − Q˜′s||F0s ]
∣∣∣Ft]∣∣∣∣2
}
+ CE
{
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣E [ sup
0≤s≤T
E[ |Qs −Q′s||F0s ]
∣∣Ft]∣∣∣∣2
}
≤ CdE
[∫ T
0
(Qt −Q′t)2 dt
]
+ CdE
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|Qt −Q′t|2
]
,
(2.17)
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where C is independent of ǫ. Finally, considering the SDE for Q˜ in terms of H˜ , by (2.15), (2.17) and the
same argument as (2.12), we have
‖Q˜− Q˜′‖α ≤ Cd‖Q−Q′‖α.
Thus, when d is small enough, Φ is a contraction. Iterating the argument finitely often and letting
f ′ = b′ = 0 yields the desired result.
Theorem 2.3. The FBSDE system (2.1) admits a unique solution (Q,H,R) ∈ Hα × S2,−F × L2F, where
0 < α < β.
Proof. We first prove the existence of a solution. In a second step we prove the uniqueness of solutions.
Step 1. Existence of a solution. By Lemma 2.2, the FBSDE system (2.7) admits a solution (Q,H,R) ∈
Hα × S2,−F × L2F when p = 0, for any f ∈ L2F. Hence it remains to prove that if for some p ∈ [0, 1] the
system (2.7) admits a solution for any f ∈ L2
F
, then the same result holds true for p+ d for some small
enough constant d that is independent of p. The proof is similar to proof of Lemma 2.2.
For any fixed (Q,R, f) ∈ Hα × L2F × L2F, we introduce the following system:
dQ˜t =
(
−Λ1t R˜t − Λ2tE
[
γtQ˜t
∣∣∣F0t ]+ f t) dt,
−dH˜t =
(
−Λ1tAtH˜t − Λ2tAtE[γtQ˜t|F0t ] +Atf t + pΛ3tE[ζtR˜t|F0t ] + pΛ5tE[̺tQ˜t|F0t ] + gt
)
dt,
+
(
ft + dΛ
3
tE[ζtRt|F0t ] + dΛ5tE[̺tQt|F0t ]
)
dt− Zt dWt,
−dR˜t =
(
Λ4t Q˜t + pΛ
3
tE[ζtR˜t|F0s ] + dΛ3tE[ζtRt|F0s ] + pΛ5tE[̺tQ˜t|F0t ] + dΛ5tE[̺tQt|F0t ]
+gt + ft) dt− Zt dWt,
R˜ = AQ˜+ H˜, t ∈ [0, T ),
Q˜0 = χ, Q˜T = 0.
(2.18)
Since f + dΛ3E[ζR|F0] + dΛ5E[̺Q|F0] ∈ L2
F
, there exists a solution (Q˜, H˜, R˜) ∈ Hα × S2,−F × L2F by
assumption. This defines a mapping
Φ : (Q,R) ∈ Hα × L2F → (Q˜, R˜) ∈ Hα × L2F. (2.19)
It is sufficient to prove the existence of a fixed point of Φ. To this end, for any Q, Q′ ∈ Hα, R, R′ ∈ L2F,
by integration by part and using the same arguments leading to the estimate (2.14),
E
[∫ T
0
(R˜t − R˜′t)2 dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
(Q˜t − Q˜′t)2 dt
]
≤dCE
[∫ T
0
(Qt −Q′t)2 dt
]
+ dCE
[∫ T
0
(Rt −R′t)2 dt
]
.
(2.20)
The preceding estimate allows us to estimate Q˜ in terms of R˜ as follows
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|Q˜t − Q˜′t|2
]
≤ CE
[∫ T
0
|R˜s − R˜′s|2 ds
]
+ C
∫ T
0
E
[
|Q˜′s − Q˜s|2
]
ds
≤ dCE
[∫ T
0
(Qt −Q′t)2 dt
]
+ dCE
[∫ T
0
(Rt −R′t)2 dt
]
.
(2.21)
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By (2.21), a similar argument as in (2.17) yields the existence of a uniform C such that for any ǫ > 0,
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T−ǫ
∣∣∣H˜t − H˜ ′t∣∣∣2] ≤ CE [ sup
0≤s≤T
|Q˜s − Q˜′s|2
]
+ CE
[∫ T
0
|R˜t − R˜′t|2 dt
]
+ CdE
[
sup
0≤s≤T
|Qs −Q′s|2
]
+ CdE
[∫ T
0
|Rt −R′t|2 dt
]
.
(2.22)
Now we return to the expression of Q˜ in terms of H˜ , from which we have by (2.21), (2.22) and the same
argument as in (2.12) that,
E
 sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣∣ Q˜t − Q˜′t(T − t)α
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 ≤ Cd‖Q−Q′‖2α + CdE
[∫ T
0
|Rt −R′t|2 dt
]
. (2.23)
By the estimates (2.20) and (2.23), when d is small enough we have a fixed point which is a solution to
(2.7) when p is replaced by p+ d. Iterating the argument finitely often and then taking f = 0 yields the
existence of a solution.
Step 2. Uniqueness of solutions. Let us assume to the contrary that there exist two solutions (Q,H,R) ∈
Hα × S2,−F × L2F and (Q′, H ′, R′) ∈ Hα × S2,−F × L2F to (2.1). As in the proof of Step 1. integration by
part for (Q −Q′)(R −R′) yields,
E
[∫ T
0
(Rt −R′t)2 + (Qt −Q′t)2 dt
]
= 0. (2.24)
Secondly, by the expression of (Q −Q′) in terms of R−R′, (2.24) yields that
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|Qt −Q′t|2
]
= 0. (2.25)
Thirdly, the expression for (H −H ′), (2.24) and (2.25) yield that for any ǫ > 0
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T−ǫ
|Ht −H ′t|2
]
= 0. (2.26)
Finally, by the expression for (Q−Q′) in terms of (H −H ′), (2.24), (2.25), (2.26) and arbitrariness of ǫ
yield that
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣Qt −Q′t(T − t)α
∣∣∣∣2
]
= 0. (2.27)
Remark 2.4. From the proof of Lemma 2.2 and Theorem 2.3 (see e.g. (2.9) and (2.11)), we see that for
f ≡ 0, the regularity of the solution can be increased to (Q,H) ∈ Hβ ×Hς , where ς < 12 ∧ β. This is the
case in [14].
The following corollary is important for the analysis of our leader-follower game of optimal portfolio
liquidation analyzed below. It implies that the follower’s optimal response function is linear convex and
hence that the leader’s control problem is convex.
Corollary 2.5. The mapping (f, g) ∈ S2
F
× L2
F
→ (Q,H,R)(f, g) ∈ Hα × S2,−F × L2F is well defined and
convex.
Proof. By Theorem 2.3, for each (f, g) ∈ S2
F
× L2
F
, there exists a unique solution (Q,H,R). Thus, the
mapping is well defined. Moreover, by the uniqueness again, we have for ρ ∈ [0, 1]
(Q,H,R)(ρ(f, g) + (1 − ρ)(f ′, g′)) = ρ(Q,H,R)(f, g) + (1− ρ)(Q,H,R)(f ′, g′).
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Using the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2.3 we can also get existence of a unique solution
to the “penalized version” of (2.1) where the terminal state constraint on the forward process is replaced
by the terminal condition of the backward process RT = 2nQT . To this end, we introduce the BSDE,
−dAnt =
(
Λ4t − Λ1t (Ant )2
)
dt− Zt dWt, AnT = 2n.
Existence and uniqueness of a solution to this equation has been established in [5]. Moreover, for each
t ∈ [0, T ),
lim
n→∞
Ant = At, a.s.. (2.28)
When the terminal state constraint is replaced by the penalty term introduced above, the system (2.1)
translates into the following system:
dQnt =
(
−Λ1tRnt − Λ2tE
[
γtQ
n
t | F0t
]
+ f
n
t
)
dt,
−dHnt =
(
−Λ1tAnt − Λ2tAnt E[γtQnt |F0t ] +Ant f
n
t + Λ
3
tE[ζtR
n
t |F0t ]
+Λ5tE[̺tQ
n
t |F0t ] + gnt
)
dt− Zt dWt,
−dRnt =
(
Λ4tQ
n
t + Λ
3
tE[ζtR
n
t |F0s ] + Λ5tE[̺tQnt |F0t ] + gnt
)
dt− Zt dWt,
Qn0 = χ, H
n
T = 0, R
n
T = 2nQ
n
T ,
(2.29)
Corollary 2.6. Assume that for each fixed n ∈ N, (fn, gn) ∈ S2
F
×L2
F
. Then, for each n ∈ N the FBSDE
(2.29) admits a unique solution (Qn, Hn, Rn) ∈ Hα,n × S2F × L2F, where
Hα,n =
{
X : E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣ Xt(T − t+ 1n )α
∣∣∣∣2
]
<∞
}
.
Remark 2.7. Note that in (2.29), the terminal condition for Hn is 0 so Hn is defined on [0, T ]. In (2.1)
the process H is only defined on [0, T ), due to to the singularity of the process A at the terminal time.
2.2 Convergence
We now prove an approximation result for the system (2.1) in terms of the systems (2.29) as n → ∞.
The convergence result is established under the additional assumption that for any 0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ T ,
e−
∫ t2
t1
Λ1uAu du ≤ C T − t2
T − t1 and e
−
∫ t2
t1
Λ1uA
n
u du ≤ CT − t2 +
1
n
T − t1 + 1n
. (2.30)
We refer to [14] for sufficient conditions on the model parameters under which this assumption is satisfied.
The proof of the following lemma can be found in [14, Lemma 4.4].
Lemma 2.8. Let f
n ∈ S2
F
and gn ∈ L2
F
be two sequences of progressively measurable stochastic processes
and (Qn, Hn, Rn) be the solution to the system (2.29). If the sequences f
n
and gn are bounded in S2
F
and L2
F
uniformly in n, respectively, then
sup
n
‖Qn‖α,n + sup
n
‖Hn‖S2,− + sup
n
‖Rn‖L2 ≤ C
(
sup
n
‖fn‖S2 + sup
n
‖gn‖L2
)
<∞.
Lemma 2.9. Let f
n
and gn be two sequences of stochastic processes satisfying the conditions in Lemma
2.8. Then there exists f ∈ L2
F
, g ∈ L2
F
and a convex combination of a subsequence of (f
n
, gn) converging
to (f, g) in Lν with 1 < ν < 2, i.e.,
lim
N→∞
E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
k=1
(f
nk
t , g
nk
t )− (f t, gt)
∣∣∣∣∣
ν
dt
]
= 0. (2.31)
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Proof. Since the sequence (f
n
, gn) is L2 uniformly bounded, the proof of [7, Theorem 2.1] tells us there
exists a subsequence of (f
n
, gn) and a progressively measurable stochastic processes (f, g) such that
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
(f
nk
, gnk)− (f, g) = 0, a.e. a.s. on [0, T ]× Ω.
Fatou’s lemma implies that
E
[∫ T
0
|(f t, gt)|2 dt
]
≤ lim inf
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
E
[∫ T
0
|(fnkt , gnkt )|2 dt
]
<∞.
Thus, Vitali’s convergence result implies (2.31).
The following theorem proves a convergence result for the FBSDE systems associated with the uncon-
strained penalized control problems to the system associated with the constrained one. The result is key
to our maximum principle for the leader-follower game introduced above.
Theorem 2.10. Let (f
n
, gn) be the sequence satisfying the conditions in Lemma 2.9 and (f, g) ∈
L2
F
× L2
F
be the limit. Let (Qn, Hn, Rn) and (Q,H,R) be the solution to (2.29) and (2.1), respectively.
We further assume the limit f ∈ S2
F
. Then there exists a convex combination of a subsequence of(
1
N
∑N
k=1Q
nk , 1N
∑N
k=1H
nk , 1N
∑N
k=1 R
nk
)
converging to (Q,H,R) in Sν
F
× L1
F
× Lν
F
, i.e.,
lim
N ′→∞
E
 sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N ′
N ′∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
Qnkt −Qt
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν = 0,
lim
N ′→∞
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N ′
N ′∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
Hnkt −Ht
∣∣∣∣∣∣ dt
 = 0,
lim
N ′→∞
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N ′
N ′∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
Rnkt −Rt
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν
dt
 = 0.
Proof. The uniform boundedness of f
n
and gn implies the uniform boundedness of Rn in L2 (Lemma 2.8)
and the uniform boundedness of 1N
∑N
k=1R
nk in L2. Thus, [7] again yields the existence of a progressively
measurable process R ∈ L2
F
and a subsequence of 1N
∑N
k=1 R
nk such that
lim
N ′→∞
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N ′
N ′∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
Rnkt −Rt
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν
dt
 = 0. (2.32)
By (2.31), the convergence of the same convex combination holds for (f
n
, gn):
lim
N ′→∞
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N ′
N ′∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
(f
nk
t , g
nk
t )− (f t, gt)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν
dt
 = 0. (2.33)
Define Q as the unique solution in S2
F
to the following mean field SDE in terms of the limits f and R:
Qt = χ+
∫ t
0
(−Λ1sRs − Λ2sE[γsQs|F0s ] + fs) ds. (2.34)
Standard SDE estimates, (2.32) and (2.33) yield,
lim
N ′→∞
E
 sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N ′
N ′∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
Qnkt −Qt
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν = 0. (2.35)
13
Now define H in terms of the limits f , R and Q as
Ht =E
[∫ T
t
e−
∫
s
t
Λ1uAu du
(−Λ2sAsE[γsQs|F0s ] +Asf s + Λ3sE[ζsRs|F0s ]
+Λ5sE[̺sQs|F0s ] + gs
)
ds
∣∣Ft] . (2.36)
Thus, by (2.3), (2.30) and Ho¨lder inequality,∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N ′
N ′∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
Hnkt −Ht
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ C
N ′
N ′∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
E
(∫ T
t
∣∣∣e− ∫ st Λ1uAnku duAnks − e− ∫ st Λ1uAu duAs∣∣∣ ds
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft

1
2
×
(
E
[
sup
0≤s≤T
|E[Qnks |F0s ]|2 + sup
0≤s≤T
(f
nk
s )
2
∣∣∣∣Ft]) 12
+
C
N ′
N ′∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
(
E
[∫ T
t
∣∣∣e− ∫ st Λ1uAnku du − e− ∫ st Λ1uAu du∣∣∣2 ds∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]) 1
2
(
E
[∫ T
t
|gnks |2 ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]) 1
2
+
C
(T − t) 1ν
E
∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N ′
N ′∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
Qnks −Qs
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν∣∣∣∣∣∣F0s
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N ′
N ′∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
fnks − f s
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν
ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft

1
ν
+
C
N ′
N ′∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
(
E
[∫ T
t
∣∣∣e− ∫ st Λ1uAnku − e− ∫ st Λ1uAu ∣∣∣2 ds∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]) 1
2
(
E
[∫ T
t
E[(Rnks )
2 + (Qnks )
2|F0s ] ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]) 1
2
+ CE
∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N ′
N ′∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
Rnks −Rs
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N ′
N ′∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
Qnks −Qs
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣F0s
 ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft

+ E
∫ T
t
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N ′
N ′∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
gnks − gs
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft
 .
Applying Ho¨lder’s inequality again along with Doob’s maximal inequality, the uniform boundedness of
(Qn, Rn, f
n
, gn) and the dominated convergence theorem we get,
lim
N ′→∞
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N ′
N ′∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
Hnkt −Ht
∣∣∣∣∣∣ dt
 = 0. (2.37)
Let R̂ = AQ+H . For any T˜ < T , by (2.35) and (2.37) we have
lim
N ′→∞
E
∫ T˜
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N ′
N ′∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
Rnkt − R̂t
∣∣∣∣∣∣ dt
 = 0.
Thus, (2.32) implies that for any T˜ < T ,
E
[∫ T˜
0
|R̂t −Rt| dt
]
= 0.
This proves that
R̂ = R, a.e. a.s. on [0, T ]× Ω.
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Thus, the limit (Q,H, R̂) satisfies the system (2.1). Moreover,
(Q,H, R̂) ∈ Hα × S2,−F × L2F.
Indeed, since R ∈ L2
F
and R = R˜ a.e. a.s. on [0, T ]× Ω, we have that R̂ ∈ L2
F
. Moreover, (2.34) implies
that Q ∈ S2
F
, from which (2.36) implies H ∈ S2,−
F
and taking R̂ = AQ +H into (2.34) yields Q ∈ Hα.
Hence, the uniqueness of solutions in Hα × S2,−F × L2F yields the desired convergence result.
3 A MFC problem of optimal portfolio liquidation
In this section, we solve the single-player portfolio liquidation model with expectations feedback intro-
duced in Section 1.2.1. We make the following assumption which implies Assumption 2.1.
Assumption 3.1. The process g˜ belongs to L2
F
. The progressively measurable stochastic processes η, κ
and λ are nonnegative and essentially bounded. Moreover, there exists some θ′ > 0 such that
η⋆ − ‖κ‖
2θ′
> 0, λ⋆ − ‖κ‖θ′ > 0.
The trader’s objective is to minimize the cost function J(·) introduced in (1.4) over the set of admissible
controls
AF(x) :=
{
ξ ∈ L2F([0, T ]× Ω;R) :
∫ T
0
ξs ds = x
}
.
A standard stochastic maximum principle suggests the candidate optimal strategy is given by
ξ∗t =
Yt − E[κtXt|F0t ]
2ηt
(3.1)
where (X,Y ) ∈ Hα × L2F is the unique solution to the FBSDE system (1.7). Standard arguments show
that ξ∗ ∈ AF(x). To prove that ξ∗ is indeed the unique optimal control, we establish an auxiliary result
that substitutes for the lack of convexity of the Hamiltonian for our MFC problem.
Lemma 3.2. For every t ∈ [0, T ), we have
E
[
κtXtE[ξt|F0t ] + ηtξ2t + λtX2t
]− E [κtX∗t E[ξ∗t |F0t ] + ηt(ξ∗t )2 + λt(X∗t )2]
≥ E [(E[κtX∗t |F0t ] + 2ηtξ∗t ) (ξt − ξ∗t ) + 2λtX∗t (Xt −X∗t ) + κt(Xt −X∗t )E[ξ∗t |F0t ]] . (3.2)
Moreover, the above inequality becomes an equality if and only if ξt = ξ
∗
t a.s..
Proof. To prove (3.2), it is equivalent to show
E
[
ηt(ξt − ξ∗t )2 + λt(Xt −X∗t )2 + E[(ξt − ξ∗t )|F0t ]E[κt(Xt −X∗t )|F0t ]
] ≥ 0.
Note that
|E [E[(ξt − ξ∗t )|F0t ]E[κt(Xt −X∗t )|F0t ]] |
≤ ‖κ‖E [E[|ξt − ξ∗t ||F0t ]E[|Xt −X∗t ||F0t ]]
≤ ‖κ‖
2θ
E
[(
E[|ξt − ξ∗t ||F0t ]
)2]
+
‖κ‖θ
2
E
[(
E[|Xt −X∗t ||F0t ]
)2]
.
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Thus,
E
[
ηt(ξt − ξ∗t )2 + λt(Xt −X∗t )2 + E[(ξt − ξ∗t )|F0t ]E[κt(Xt −X∗t )|F0t ]
]
≥ E
[(
η⋆ − ‖κ‖
2θ
)
(ξt − ξ∗t )2 +
(
λ⋆ − ‖κ‖θ
2
)
(Xt −X∗t )2 − ‖κ‖E[|ξt − ξ∗t ||F0t ]E[|Xt −X∗t ||F0t ]
]
+
‖κ‖
2θ
E
[
(ξt − ξ∗t )2
]
+
‖κ‖θ
2
E
[
(Xt −X∗t )2
]
≥ E
[(
η⋆ − ‖κ‖
2θ
)
(ξt − ξ∗t )2 +
(
λ⋆ − ‖κ‖θ
2
)
(Xt −X∗t )2 − ‖κ‖E[|ξt − ξ∗t ||F0t ]E[|Xt −X∗t ||F0t ]
]
+
‖κ‖
2θ
E
[
(E[|ξt − ξ∗t ||F0t ])2
]
+
‖κ‖θ
2
E
[
(E[|Xt −X∗t ||F0t ])2
]
≥ E
[(
η⋆ − ‖κ‖
2θ
)
(ξt − ξ∗t )2 +
(
λ⋆ − ‖κ‖θ
2
)
(Xt −X∗t )2
]
≥ 0.
The second claim is obvious from the above estimate.
We are now ready to state and prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.3. Under Assumption 3.1 the process ξ∗ defined in (3.1) is the unique optimal control to
the MFC problem (1.4)-(1.5).
Proof. To prove the optimality of the candidate strategy ξ∗ we fix an arbitrary control ξ ∈ AF(x) and
denote by X∗ and X the corresponding state processes. For any ǫ > 0, it follows from Lemma 3.2 that
E
[∫ T−ǫ
0
κtXtE[ξt|F0t ] + g˜tXt + ηtξ2t + λtX2t dt
]
− E
[∫ T−ǫ
0
κtX
∗
t E[ξ
∗
t |F0t ] + g˜tX∗t + ηt(ξ∗t )2 + λt(X∗t )2 dt
]
≥ E
[∫ T−ǫ
0
(
E[κtX
∗
t |F0t ] + 2ηtξ∗t
)
(ξt − ξ∗t ) + (2λtX∗t + κtE[ξ∗t |F0t ] + g˜t)(Xt −X∗t ) dt
]
.
(3.3)
Integration by part yields,
E
[
YT−ǫ(XT−ǫ −X∗T−ǫ)
]
=− E
[∫ T−ǫ
0
Yt(ξt − ξ∗t ) dt
]
− E
[∫ T−ǫ
0
(Xt −X∗t )
(
κtE
[
Y ∗t
2ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]
−κtE
[
1
2ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]E[κtX∗t |F0t ] + 2λtX∗t + g˜t) dt]
= − E
[∫ T−ǫ
0
Yt(ξt − ξ∗t ) dt
]
− E
[∫ T−ǫ
0
(Xt −X∗t )
(
κtE
[
ξ∗t |F0t
]
+ 2λtX
∗
t + g˜t
)
dt
]
.
(3.4)
Putting (3.4) into (3.3), we have
E
[∫ T−ǫ
0
κtXtE[ξt|F0t ] + g˜tXt + ηtξ2t + λtX2t dt
]
− E
[∫ T−ǫ
0
κtX
∗
t E[ξ
∗
t |F0t ] + g˜tX∗t + ηt(ξ∗t )2 + λt(X∗t )2 dt
]
+ E
[
YT−ǫ(XT−ǫ −X∗T−ǫ)
]
≥ E
[∫ T−ǫ
0
(
E[κtX
∗
t |F0t ] + 2ηtξ∗t − Yt
)
(ξt − ξ∗t ) dt
]
= 0.
(3.5)
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Letting ǫ→ 0, a similar argument as the proof of [14, Theorem 2.9] yields that
lim
ǫ→0
E[YT−ǫ(XT−ǫ −X∗T−ǫ)] = 0.
Thus, (3.5) implies
J(ξ) ≥ J(ξ∗).
In order to prove the uniqueness of optimal controls, let ξ′ be another optimal control. Then, (3.5) yields
0 = E
[∫ T
0
κtXtE[ξ
′
t|F0t ] + g˜tX ′t + ηt(ξ′t)2 + λt(X ′t)2 dt
]
− E
[∫ T
0
κtX
∗
t E[ξ
∗
t |F0t ] + g˜tX∗t + ηt(ξ∗t )2 + λt(X∗t )2 dt
]
≥ E
[∫ T
0
(
E[κtX
∗
t |F0t ] + 2ηtξ∗t − Yt
)
(ξ′t − ξ∗t ) dt
]
= 0.
Thus, (3.3) holds with an equality. The second claim in Lemma 3.2 implies the uniqueness.
4 A Stackelberg game of optimal portfolio liquidation
In this section, we solve the Stackelberg game of optimal portfolio liquidation introduced in Section 1.2.2
above. We make the following assumption which implies Assumption 2.1 and Assumption (2.30).
Assumption 4.1. (1) The processes κ˜0, κ, η, 1/η and λ belong to L∞
F
([0, T ]× Ω; [0,∞)).
(2) The processes κ0, κ0, η0, 1/η0 and λ0 belong to L∞
F0
([0, T ]× Ω; [0,∞)).
(3) For some positive constants θ′, θ and θ,
η⋆ − ‖κ‖
2θ′
> 0, λ⋆ − ‖κ‖θ′ > 0.
and
η0⋆ −
‖κ0‖
2θ
> 0, λ0⋆ −
‖κ0‖θ
2
− ‖κ
0‖θ
2
> 0, λ⋆ − ‖κ
0‖
2θ
> 0.
(4) For any 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T ,
e−
∫
t
s
Au
2ηu
du ≤ C
(
T − t
T − s
)
and
e−
∫
t
s
Anu
2ηu
du ≤ C
(
T − t+ 1n
T − s+ 1n
)
.
The problem of the Stackelberg leader is to minimize the cost functional (1.9) over the set of admissible
controls
AF0(x0) :=
{
ξ0 ∈ L2
F0
([0, T ]× Ω;R) :
∫ T
0
ξ0s ds = x
0
}
.
The follower’s optimal response function is given by
ξt := ξt(ξ
0) :=
Yt(ξ
0)− E[κtXt(ξ0)|F0t ]
2ηt
, (4.1)
where (X,Y ) is the solution to (1.7) with g˜ = κ˜0ξ0. We will occasionally drop the dependence on ξ0 if
there is no confusion. Under Assumption 4.1 the solution (X,Y ) enjoys better regularity properties, due
to Remark 2.4 and the estimate (2.3).
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Corollary 4.2. Under Assumption 4.1, the solution to (1.7) belongs to H1×S2F. Moreover, Y = AX+B
with B ∈ Hς .
In the next section we first prove that the leader’s problem has a unique solution if the terminal state
constraints are replaced by finite penalty terms and establish a necessary maximum principle for the
penalized problem. Subsequently we prove the convergence of the state and adjoint equations of the
penalized problems as the degree of penalization tends to infinity.
4.1 The penalized problem: existence and maximum principle
The penalized optimization problem is obtained by replacing the terminal state constraint on the leader’s
and follower’s state process by a finite penalty term. The leader’s problem consists in minimizing the
cost functional
J0,n(ξ0) := E
[∫ T
0
κ0sE[ξ
n
s |F0s ]X0s + κ0sξ0sX0s + η0s(ξ0s )2 + λ0s(X0s )2 + λs(E[ξ
n
s |F0s ])2 ds+ n(X0T )2
]
(4.2)
over all controls ξ0 ∈ L2
F0
subject to the state dynamics
dX0t = − ξ0t dt,
dXt = − Yt − E[κtXt|F
0
t ]
2ηt
dt,
−dYt =
(
κtE
[
Yt
2ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]− κtE [ 12ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]E[κtXt|Ft] + 2λtXt + κ˜0t ξ0t) dt− Zt dWt,
X0 = x, X
0
0 = x
0, YT = 2nXT ,
(4.3)
where the optimal response for the penalized follower ξ
n
is defined as follows in terms of (X,Y ) in (4.3)
ξ
n
:=
Y − E[κX |F0]
2η
.
We are now going to show that the penalized optimization problem has a unique solution. Similar
arguments could be used to prove the existence of an optimal control for the original problem. They
would not, however, give us an open-loop characterization of the optimal control.
Theorem 4.3. For each n ∈ N, the penalized optimization problem (4.2)-(4.3) admits a unique optimal
control in L2
F0
.
Proof. In view of Corollary 2.6 the systems (4.3) is well-posed for each fixed ξ0 ∈ L2
F0
. The representation
of the cost functional
J0,n(ξ0)
= E
∫ T
0
κ0t
2
√θX0t + E
[
ξ
n
t
∣∣∣F0t ]√
θ
2 + κ0t
2
(√
θX0t +
ξ0t√
θ
)2
+
(
λ0t −
κ0t θ
2
− κ
0
t θ
2
)
(X0t )
2
+
(
η0t −
κ0t
2θ
)
(ξ0t )
2 +
(
λt − κ
0
t
2θ
)(
E
[
ξ
n
t
∣∣∣F0t ])2 dt+ n(X0T )2]
along with Corollary 2.5 and Assumption 4.1 shows that J0,n is strictly convex. Uniqueness of the
optimal strategy follows.
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Let J∗ = infξ0∈L2
F0
J0,n(ξ0). Then J∗ < ∞ because J0,n(x0/T ) is bounded. Let {ξ0,n,m} ⊆ L2
F0
be a
sequence such that
lim
m→∞
J0,n(ξ0,n,m) = J∗.
By Assumption 4.1 this implies,
sup
m
E
[∫ T
0
(ξ0,n,ms )
2 ds
]
< C. (4.4)
Thus, Lemma 2.9 implies the existence of some ξ0,n,∗ ∈ L2
F0
such that
lim
N→∞
E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣ξ0,n,Nt − ξ0,n,∗t ∣∣∣ν dt
]
= 0, 1 < ν < 2, (4.5)
where
ξ
0,n,N
=
1
N
N∑
k=1
ξ0,n,mk .
Let (X0,n,∗, Xn,∗, Y n,∗) be the solution to (4.3) associated with ξ0,n,∗. Then the same argument as in
the proof of Theorem 2.10 implies,
lim
N→∞
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
(Xn,mkt , Y
n,mk
t )− (Xn,∗t , Y n,∗t )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν
dt
 = 0, 1 < ν < 2.
Moreover, (4.5) yields,
lim
N→∞
E
 sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
X0,n,mkt −X0,n,∗t
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν
dt
 = 0.
Thus, Fatou’s lemma and the convexity of J0,n imply that
J0,n(ξ0,n,∗) ≤ lim inf
N→∞
J0,n
 1
N
N∑
j=1
ξ
0,n,Nj
 ≤ lim inf
N→∞
1
N
N∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
J0,n
(
ξ0,n,mk
)
= J∗.
From now on, we denote by ξ0,n,∗ the unique optimal control for the penalized optimization (4.2)-(4.3).
The following theorem provides a characterization of ξ0,n,∗.
Theorem 4.4 (Necessary maximum principle). The optimal control ξ0,n,∗ admits the following repre-
sentation:
ξ0,n,∗t =
pnt + E[κ˜
0
t q
n
t |F0t ]− κ0tX0,n,∗t
2η0t
, a.e. a.s. on [0, T ]× Ω, (4.6)
where X0,n,∗, pn and qn satisfy the following FBSDE system:
dX0,n,∗t = − ξ0,n,∗t dt,
dXn,∗t = − ξn,∗t dt,
−dY n,∗t =
(
κtE
[
ξn,∗t |F0t
]
+ 2λtX
n,∗
t + κ˜
0
t ξ
0,n,∗
t
)
dt− Zt dWt,
−dpnt =
(
κ0tE
[
ξn,∗t |F0t
]
+ κ0t ξ
0,n,∗
t + 2λ
0
tX
0,n,∗
t
)
dt− Zt dW 0t ,
−dqnt =
(
− r
n
t
2ηt
− E [κtqnt |F0t ] 12ηt + fnt
)
dt,
−drnt =
(
−2λtqnt + κtE
[
rt
2ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]+ κtE [ 12ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]E[κtqnt |F0t ] + gnt ) dt− Zt dWt,
X00 = x
0, X0 = x, Y
n,∗
T = 2nX
n,∗
T , p
n
T = 2nX
0,n,∗
T , r
n
T = −2nqnT , qn0 = 0,
(4.7)
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where
ξn,∗t :=
Y n,∗t − E[κtXn,∗t |F0t ]
2ηt
, (4.8)
f
n
t :=
κ0tX
0,n,∗
t
2ηt
+
λt
ηt
E
[
ξn,∗t |F0t
]
, (4.9)
and
gnt := −κtE
[
1
2ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]κ0tX0,n,∗t − 2λtκtE [ 12ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]E [ξn,∗t |F0t ] . (4.10)
Proof. A unique optimal control ξ0,n,∗ exists, due to Theorem 4.3. It is to be viewed as an exogenous
input to the FBSDE system (4.7). Thus, the system (Xn,∗, Y n,∗) is a special case of (2.29) by taking
(4.8) into account. Corollary 2.6 implies that the system is well-posed. Considering f
n
and gn as inputs,
the system (qn, rn) is well-posed, again due to Corollary 2.6. The characterization (4.6) is then a direct
result of stochastic maximum principle for control of FBSDE with partial information; cf [24].
The ansatz pn = A
n
X0,n,∗+pn shows that the equation for pn could be dropped from the above system.
It yields the following BSDEs for the processes A
n
and pn that will be used in the next subsection:
−dAnt =
(
− (A
n
t )
2
2η0t
+
κ0tA
n
t
2η0t
+ 2λ0t
)
dt− ZAnt dW 0t ,
A
n
T = 2n
(4.11)
and 
−dpnt =
(
−A
n
t p
n
t
2η0t
− A
n
t E[κ˜
0
t q
n
t |F0t ]
2η0t
+ κ0t ξ
0,n,∗
t + κ
0
tE
[
ξn,∗t |F0t
])
dt− Zpnt dW 0t ,
pnT = 0.
(4.12)
4.2 The optimal solution to the Stackelberg game
Let us recall that ξ0,n,∗ denotes the leader’s optimal control for penalized optimization with index n ∈ N.
The uniform boundedness of J0,n(x0/T ) in n ∈ N implies,
sup
n
E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣ξ0,n,∗t ∣∣∣2 dt+ n(X0,n,∗T )2
]
<∞. (4.13)
Thus, the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 2.9 yield the existence of a progressively measurable
process
ξ0,∗ ∈ L2
F0
(Ω× [0, T ];R) (4.14)
such that
lim
N→∞
E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
k=1
ξ0,nk,∗t − ξ0,∗t
∣∣∣∣∣
ν
dt
]
= 0, 1 < ν < 2. (4.15)
Our goal is to prove that ξ0,∗ is the leader’s unique optimal strategy in the original state-constrained
Stackelberg game. To this end, we first establish a representation of ξ0,∗ in terms of the solution to
the system (1.10), (1.12) and (1.13) by proving that the solutions to the system of state and adjoint
equations (4.7) for the unconstrained penalized MFC problem Cesaro converge to the solutions to the
systems (1.7), (1.10), (1.12) and (1.13). From this, we then deduce a sufficient maximum principle for
the leader’s MFC problem from which we conclude the optimality of the candidate strategy ξ0,∗.
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4.2.1 Approximation
With the limit ξ0,∗ at hand, we can consider the FBSDE system (1.7), (1.10), (1.12) and (1.13) with ξ0
replaced by ξ0,∗. The system (1.7) for (X∗, Y ∗) is well-posed, due to Corollary 4.2. The system for (q, r)
is well-posed, due to the following corollary.
Corollary 4.5. If we take χ = x0, Λ1 = Λ2 = ζ = 1/2η, γ = Λ3 = ̺ = κ, Λ4 = 2λ, Λ5 = κE
[
1
2η
∣∣∣F0],
Q = −q,
f =
κ0X0,∗
2η
+
λ
η
E
[
ξ∗|F0] (4.16)
and
g = −κE
[
1
2η
∣∣∣∣F0]κ0X0,∗ − 2λκE [ 12η
∣∣∣∣F0]E [ξ∗|F0] , (4.17)
where
ξ∗ :=
Y ∗
2η
− 1
2η
E[κtX
∗|F0]. (4.18)
Then the system (1.2) reduces (1.13). Hence, existence and uniqueness of a solution holds for (1.13).
Moreover, r = −Aq +D with D ∈ S2,−
F
.
We now introduce two BSDEs that we expect to be the limits to the equations (4.11) and (4.12):
−dAt =
(
− A
2
t
2η0t
+
κ0tAt
2η0t
+ 2λ0t
)
dt− Zt dW 0t
lim
tրT
At = ∞,
(4.19)
and −dpt =
(
−Atpt
2η0t
− AtE[κ˜
0
t qt|F0t ]
2η0t
+ κ0t ξ
0,∗
t + κ
0
tE
[
ξ∗t |F0t
])
dt− Zpt dW 0t ,
pT = 0.
(4.20)
where ξ∗ and ξ0,∗ are defined in (4.18) and (4.14), respectively. The following lemma confirms our guess.
It shows that the solutions to the FBSDE system (4.7) converge to the solutions to the FBSDE systems
(1.7), (1.10), (1.13) and (4.20) in the same sense as the optimal solutions to the unconstrained penalized
problems converge to the candidate solution of the constrained problem.
Lemma 4.6. For 1 < ν < 2, it holds that
lim
N→∞
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
k=1
X0,nk,∗t −X0,∗t
∣∣∣∣∣
ν]
= 0, (4.21)
lim
N→∞
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
Xnk,∗t −X∗t
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν
dt
 = 0, (4.22)
lim
N→∞
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
Y nk,∗t − Y ∗t
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν
dt
 = 0, (4.23)
lim
N˜→∞
E
 sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N˜
N˜∑
i=1
1
N i
Ni∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
qnkt − qt
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν = 0, (4.24)
lim
N˜→∞
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N˜
N˜∑
i=1
1
N i
Ni∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
rnkt − rt
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν
dt
 = 0, (4.25)
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lim
N˜→∞
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N˜
N˜∑
i=1
1
N i
Ni∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
pnkt − pt
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν
dt
 = 0. (4.26)
Proof. The convergence (4.21) follows immediately from the convergence (4.15) and the definition of
X0,∗. Taking χ = x, ζ = Λ1 = −Λ2 = 1/2η, γ = Λ3 = ̺ = κ, Λ4 = 2λ, Λ5 = −κE
[
1
2η
∣∣∣F0], fn = 0 and
gn = κ˜0ξ0,n,∗ in (2.29) the convergence (4.22) and (4.23) follows from Theorem 2.10, due to the uniform
boundedness of gn in L2.
In (2.29), let χ = x0, Λ1 = Λ2 = ζ = 1/2η, γ = Λ3 = ̺ = κ, Λ4 = 2λ, Λ5 = κE
[
1
2η
∣∣∣F0], Qn = −qn and
(f
n
, gn) as in (4.9) and (4.10). It follows from (4.21)-(4.23) that
lim
N→∞
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
(f
nk
t , g
nk)− (f t, gt)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν
dt
 = 0, (4.27)
where f and g are defined as in (4.16) and (4.17), respectively. By Corollary 4.2 and the estimate (2.3),
we have f ∈ S2
F
and g ∈ L2
F
. So (4.24) and (4.25) follow again from Theorem 2.10. By (4.15), (4.22),
(4.23) and (4.24) we also have (4.26).
The preceding approximation lemma yields a representation on the candidate optimal strategy in terms
of the candidate optimal state and adjoint processes akin to the maximum principle for the penalized
problem.
Theorem 4.7. The limit ξ0,∗ in (4.15) admits the following representation:
ξ0,∗t =
pt + E[κ˜
0
t qt|F0t ]− κ0tX0,∗t
2η0t
, a.e. a.s. on [0, T ]× Ω, (4.28)
where p := AX0,∗ + p. Moreover, ξ0,∗ ∈ AF(x0) and p satisfies the dynamic (1.12).
Proof. The characterization (4.28) follows immediately from Theorem 4.4 and Lemma 4.6. It remains
to verify the admissibility of ξ0,∗. The fact that ξ0,∗ belongs to L2
F0
is due to (4.14). By the uniform
boundedness (4.13),
lim
n→∞
E[(X0,n,∗T )
2] = 0.
By (4.21),
lim
N˜→∞
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N˜
N˜∑
i=1
1
N i
Ni∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
X0,nk,∗T −X0,∗T
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν = 0.
Thus,
E[|X0,∗T |ν ]
≤ 2E
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N˜
N˜∑
i=1
1
N i
Ni∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
X0,nk,∗T −X0,∗T
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν+ 2 1
N˜
N˜∑
i=1
1
N i
Ni∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
E
[
|X0,nk,∗T |ν
]
→ 0,
which implies X0,∗T = 0 a.s.. Finally, starting from p := AX
0,∗ + p by integration by parts and taking
into account the characterization (4.28), we know p satisfies (1.12).
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4.2.2 Sufficient maximum principle
In this section, a sufficient maximum principle is established, from which we obtain the optimality of ξ0,∗
for the leader’s MFC problem. The next theorem verifies that ξ0,∗ is indeed the unique optimal strategy
for the leader.
Theorem 4.8 (Sufficient maximum principle). Under the Assumption 4.1, ξ0,∗ given by Theorem 4.7 is
the unique optimal strategy to the leader’s optimization.
Proof. We denote by (X0,∗, X∗, Y ∗) the states corresponding to ξ0,∗ and by (X0, X, Y ) the states corre-
sponding to a generic strategy ξ0 ∈ L2
F0
. The verification is split into three steps.
Step 1. By Corollary 2.5, X and Y are convex in ξ0 in the sense that
(X(ρξ0 + (1 − ρ)ξ0′), Y (ρξ0 + (1− ρ)ξ0′)) = ρ(X(ξ0), Y (ξ0)) + (1− ρ)(X(ξ0′), Y (ξ0′)).
Thus, J0 is strictly convex in ξ0. As a result, there is at most one optimal strategy.
Step 2. Integration by part for (X0−X0,∗)p, (X −X∗)r and (Y − Y ∗)q on [0, T˜ ] for 0 ≤ T˜ < T yields,
E
[
(X0
T˜
−X0,∗
T˜
)pT˜
]
+ E
[
(XT˜ −X∗T˜ )rT˜
]
+ E
[
(YT˜ − Y ∗T˜ )qT˜
]
= − E
[∫ T˜
0
(X0t −X0,∗t )
(
κ0tE
[
ξ∗t |F0t
]
+ κ0t ξ
0,∗
t + 2λ
0
tX
0,∗
t
)
dt
]
− E
[∫ T−ǫ
0
E[κt(Xt −X∗t )|F0t ]
(
−κ0tE
[
1
2ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]X0,∗t − 2λtE [ 12ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]E[ξ∗t |F0t ]) dt
]
− E
[∫ T˜
0
E
[
Yt − Y ∗t
2ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ](κ0tX0,∗t + 2λtE [ξ∗t |F0t ]) dt
]
− E
[∫ T˜
0
(pt + E[κ˜
0
t qt|F0t ])(ξ0t − ξ0,∗t ) dt
]
,
where we recall ξ∗ is defined in (4.18).
Step 3. In order to prove the optimality of the strategy (4.28) we define, for any T˜ < T the cost
functional
J˜0(ξ0) := E
[∫ T˜
0
κ0t
(
E
[
Yt
2ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]− E [ 12ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]E[κtXt|F0t ])X0t + κ0t ξ0tX0t + η0t (ξ0t )2
+λ0t (X
0
t )
2 + λt
∣∣∣∣E [ Yt2ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]− E [ 12ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]E[κtXt|F0t ]∣∣∣∣2 dt
]
.
By direct calculation we have
J˜0(ξ0)− J˜0(ξ0,∗)
≥ E
[∫ T−ǫ
0
(X0t −X0,∗t )
(
κ0tE[ξ
∗
t |F0t ] + κ0t ξ0t + 2λ0t ξ0,∗t
)
dt
]
+ E
[∫ T−ǫ
0
E
[
Yt − Y ∗t
2ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ] (κ0tX0,∗t + 2λtE[ξ∗t |F0t ]) dt
]
+ E
[∫ T−ǫ
0
E[κt(Xt −X∗t )|F0t ]
(
−κ0tE
[
1
2ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]X0,∗t − 2λtE [ 12ηt
∣∣∣∣F0t ]E[ξ∗t |F0t ]) dt
]
+ E
[∫ T−ǫ
0
(ξ0t − ξ0,∗t )
(
κ0tX
0,∗
t + 2η
0
t ξ
0,∗
t
)
dt
]
(4.29)
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Plugging the result in Step 2 into (4.29) and taking into account the characterization (4.28), we have
J˜0(ξ0)− J˜0(ξ0,∗) + E
[
(X0
T˜
−X0,∗
T˜
)pT˜
]
+ E
[
(XT˜ −X∗T˜ )rT˜
]
+ E
[
(YT˜ − Y ∗T˜ )qT˜
]
≥ 0.
The same estimate as in the proof of [14, Theorem 2.9] yields that
lim
T˜րT
E
∣∣∣(X0
T˜
−X0,∗
T˜
)pT˜
∣∣∣ = 0.
Moreover, Corollary 4.2 and Corollary 4.5 imply that
E
[
(XT˜ −X∗T˜ )rT˜
]
+ E
[
(YT˜ − Y ∗T˜ )qT˜
]
= E
[
(XT˜ −X∗T˜ )(−AT˜ qT˜ +DT˜ ) +
(
AT˜XT˜ +BT˜ −AT˜X∗T˜ −B∗T˜
)
qT˜
]
= E
[
(XT˜ −X∗T˜ )DT˜ + (BT˜ −B∗T˜ )qT˜
]
→ 0, as T˜ ր T.
Thus, letting T˜ ր T , dominated convergence yields
J0(ξ0)− J0(ξ0,∗) ≥ 0.
As a corollary, we obtain that a convex combination of the value functions for the penalized optimization
problems converges to the value function of the constrained problem.
Corollary 4.9. There exists a convex combination of the value functions converging to J0(ξ0,∗), i.e.,
lim
N˜→∞
1
N˜
N˜∑
i=1
1
N i
Ni∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
J0,nk(ξ0,nk,∗) = J0(ξ0,∗).
Proof. Recall that X0,nk,∗ and ξnk,∗ are the optimal state of the leader and the optimal strategy of the
follower corresponding to ξ0,nk,∗, respectively. Due to the additional penalty term in the definition of
J0,nk and because ξ0,∗ is an admissible strategy for the penalized problem,1
J0(ξ0,nk,∗) ≤ J0,nk(ξ0,nk,∗) = inf
ξ∈L2
F0
([0,T ]×Ω;R)
J0,nk(ξ) ≤ J0(ξ0,∗)
Denote by K(N˜) the cost functional with (ξ0, X0, ξ) in J0 replaced by 1
N˜
N˜∑
i=1
1
N i
Ni∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
ξ0,nk,∗,
1
N˜
N˜∑
i=1
1
N i
Ni∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
X0,nk,∗,
1
N˜
N˜∑
i=1
1
N i
Ni∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
ξnk,∗
 .
By the convexity, we have
K(N˜) ≤ 1
N˜
N˜∑
i=1
1
N i
Ni∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
J0(ξ0,nk,∗) ≤ J0(ξ0,∗).
By Lemma 4.6, (4.15) and Fatou’s lemma,
J0(ξ0,∗) ≤ lim inf
N˜→∞
K(N˜) ≤ lim inf
N˜→∞
1
N˜
N˜∑
i=1
1
N i
Ni∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
k=1
J0(ξ0,nk,∗) ≤ J0(ξ0,∗).
1Notice that J0(ξ0,nk,∗) is well-defined even though ξ0,nk,∗ may not not admissible for the constrained optimization
problem.
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5 Conclusion
We established existence and uniqueness of solutions results for linear McKean Vlasov FBSDEs with
a terminal state constraint on the forward process. The general results were used to solve novel MFC
problems and mean-field leader-follower games of optimal portfolio liquidation. For the leader-follower
game it could be viewed as a MFC problem where the state dynamics follows a controlled FBSDE. For
such problems we proved a novel stochastic maximum principle. The proof was based on a approximation
method. We proved that both the sequence of optimal solutions and the sequence of state and adjoint
equations associated with a family of penalized problems Cesaro converge to a unique limit that yields
the optimal solution, respectively, the adjoint equations to the original state-constrained problem. To the
best of our knowledge, no numerical methods for simulating the solution to conditional McKean-Vlasov
FBSDEs are yet available. It would be desirable to develop such methods in order to study the interplay
between the leader’s and the follower’s equilibrium strategies in greater detail.
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